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Abstract: 
This paper simultaneously analyses the determinants of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers and the votes that these transfers earn in subsequent legislative elections in 
Portugal. Results suggest that election year increases in transfers by the central 
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jurisdictions where the government faces risk of losing support. 
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1. Introduction 
 Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are financed by broad-based taxation but 
generate benefits that are geographically limited. Previous studies have demonstrated 
that governments take their own interests, specifically, electoral successes, into account 
when allocating grants to lower levels of governments (e.g., Johansson, 2003; 
Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). The existence 
of political motivations in grant allocation may generate welfare losses, excessive 
government spending, and inequities (see Boadway and Shah, 2006). However, there 
has been little empirical study of the political determinants of increases in 
intergovernmental grants in pre-electoral periods or of the electoral benefits of grant-
funded pork barrel for incumbent politicians (Ferejohn, 1974). 
This paper tries fills this gap in the literature by analyzing an extensive dataset 
that covers legislative elections in Portugal. The data set spans the period from the 
restoration of democracy in 1974 until 2005 and covers 278 mainland Portuguese 
municipalities. Portugal is an interesting case study because transfers from the central 
government represent an important source of funding for municipalities, and because all 
municipalities have identical institutional structures and policy concerns. Additionally, 
legislative elections dates are defined exogenously from the perspective of the 
government. 
Veiga and Pinho (2007) found strong evidence of increases in intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers during election years in Portugal. The present paper analyses the 
determinants of pork-barrel spending in the allocation of grants by the Portuguese 
central government to local jurisdictions, and also the efficacy of those grants in 
producing votes for the incumbent government. If grants are used strategically to 
enhance re-election probabilities, then the incentive to manipulate grants should be 
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stronger when the incumbent is lagging behind opposition candidates. This suggests that 
the determinants of re-election prospects and pork barrel spending measures should be 
analyzed simultaneously in empirical studies. But, to the best of our knowledge, that has 
not been done so far. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the 
literature on pork barrel policies and voting functions. Section 3 introduces the 
Portuguese institutional background. The data and the econometric model are described 
in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results and, finally, section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
An important question in political economy is how economic events affect 
voting behavior. The theory’s starting point is the responsibility hypothesis (Downs, 
1957): voters hold the Government responsible for economic outcomes. This 
relationship is reflected in voting functions, which explain vote support for incumbents 
with variables measuring economic and political conditions. The first papers on this 
topic appeared in the 1970s (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; Mueller, 1970; and, Kramer, 
1971). Since then many papers have followed, analyzing specific countries or panels of 
countries, but with most studies use aggregate data.1 The number of papers estimating 
the impact of local conditions on electoral results is rather small and focuses primarily 
on the US and the UK.2 For the Portuguese case, Veiga and Veiga (forthcoming) found 
that the performance of the national economy is important for legislative election 
                                                 
1
 For surveys on economic voting see Duch and Stevenson (2008), and Paldam (2004). 
2
 Among others, see Holbrook (1991), Strumpf and Phillippe (1999), Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004) for 
U.S. presidential elections; and Johnston and Pattie (2001) for British general elections. For French 
legislative elections refer to Auberger and Dubois (2005). 
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results, but that local economic conditions also influence electoral outcomes. Building 
on the previous paper, we investigate how changes in transfers to municipalities 
influence electoral results and whether these transfers are used as a political tool to win 
elections.    
According to the first generation literature on fiscal federalism (Oates, 1999) the 
two main normative objectives for intergovernmental fiscal transfers are the 
enhancement of efficiency and a more equitable allocation of resources among local 
jurisdictions. More recently, a second generation of fiscal federalism studies3 has 
emerged that “examines the workings of different political and fiscal institutions in a 
setting of imperfect information and control with a basic focus on the incentives that 
these institutions embody and the resulting behaviour they induce from utility-
maximizing participants” (Oates, 2005, p. 356). In such a setting, the distribution of 
central government resources among local jurisdictions may also be influenced by 
positive considerations, such as the enhancement of the incumbent re-election 
probabilities (Ferejohn, 1974), and the satisfaction of powerful interest groups (Olson, 
1965).  
Two alternative theories have been put forward by the literature on redistributive 
politics that can be applied to the study of intergovernmental grants as a political tool. 
According to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993) and Dixit and Londgren (1998) 
upper-layer  governments should allocate more money towards swing regions where 
voters do not have a strong attachment to either the government or opposition parties. In 
contrast, Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that central governments are risk averse, 
and therefore invest where they already have a strong support. 
                                                 
3
 See Weingast (2009) for a survey. 
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Several papers have tested these two theories and found that, besides local 
expenditure needs and local fiscal capacity, political factors play an important role in 
the allocation of per capita intergovernmental grants among local jurisdictions. For the 
Swedish case, Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003) found strong 
evidence in favour of the Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) model. Case (2001) found that, 
in Albania, more assistance was allocated not only to swing communes but also to those 
that might be pivotal to winning a majority of seats in Parliament. For the US, 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) found that states transfer more to local governments 
that provide them with the strongest electoral support, and found little or no evidence in 
favor of the swing voter model. The Portuguese case was investigated by Veiga and 
Pinho (2007). Their results present strong evidence of grant increases during election 
years, and that municipalities with many swing voters received more grants, particularly 
during the early years of democracy.  
This paper improves on the previous literature by simultaneously analysing how 
grant increases in electoral years produce votes, and how electoral prospects influence 
opportunistic behaviour in the distribution of grants.  
 
3. Institutional background 
 
Democracy was restored in Portugal on April 25, 1974, after 48 years of 
dictatorship. A new constitution came into effect on April 25, 1976, and elections for 
the Assembly of the Republic, the Portuguese unicameral Parliament, were held on the 
same day.  The first years of the democratic period were characterized by strong 
political instability, with coalition or minority governments falling before the ends of 
their terms. The first government having a majority in Parliament emerged in the 1987 
elections, under the leadership of Cavaco Silva, from the Social Democratic Party. This 
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party achieved a second majority in 1991, but lost the following election to the 
Socialists. The Socialist Party ruled the country with minority governments until the 
resignation of António Guterres as Prime-Minister, in 2001, following poor results in 
the municipal elections. The Social Democrats took over again in 2002 under the 
leadership of Durão Barroso. Following a Presidential dismissal of the government, 
elections were called for February 2005. The Socialists won a majority in Parliament 
and, in the midst of an economic crisis, were again victorious in 2009, although they 
failed to retain a majority of deputies in parliament. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
Since the constitutional revision of 1982, that eliminated the Council of the 
Revolution, the organs of sovereignty in Portugal are the President of the Republic, the 
Assembly of the Republic, the Government, and the Courts. The Assembly of the 
Republic is the Portuguese unicameral Parliament, currently composed of 230 deputies 
elected for a four year term by direct and secret universal adult suffrage, using a 
proportional representation system in multi-seat constituencies, the districts. The 
Government consists of the Prime Minister (generally the leader of the party that 
received the most votes in the last elections), the Ministers, the Secretaries of State, and 
the Under-Secretaries of State. The Government formulates the general policy of the 
country and is the highest organ of public administration. It proposes the National 
Budget to the Assembly of the Republic, where transfers to municipalities are set 
according to the Local Finance Law. 
Portugal is a unitary state,4 comprising 278 municipalities in its mainland 
territory.5 Municipalities are concerned with improving the well-being of the population 
                                                 
4
 For an analysis of three decades of democratic local governments in Portugal see Silva Costa (2008). 
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that live in their territories. They promote social and economic development, 
organization of the territory, and supply local public goods (water and sewage, energy, 
transportation, housing, healthcare, education, culture, sports, defence of the 
environment and protection of the civilian population).6  
Budgeting rules and institutions are identical across Portuguese mainland 
municipalities, but the law regulating local public finances changed during the period 
considered. Although there has been an increase in the relative importance of local taxes 
and user charges over time, municipalities still have a low level of fiscal autonomy. The 
Portuguese Constitution establishes that municipalities have the right to share national 
fiscal revenues, and transfers from the Central Government are the main source of 
funding for municipalities. In our sample, real per capita transfers represent (on 
average) 64% of real per capita revenues. Municipalities receive conditional and 
unconditional transfers. The former are allocated by the central government and are 
usually regulated by contracts and specific programs. The central government has less 
discretionary power over unconditional transfers, since they are distributed among 
municipalities according to a formula that takes into account their needs and resources 
(namely population, area, number of freguesias - the lowest level of local government, 
taxes collected in the municipality, and the level of socio-economic development). The 
formula has changed over time, following revisions of the Local Finance Laws7. 
                                                                                                                                               
5
 There are also 30 municipalities in the Administrative Regions of Azores and Madeira, which are not 
considered in this study. While municipalities are the main local authorities in mainland Portugal, there 
are regional governments in Azores and Madeira. Thus, their municipalities are not perfectly comparable 
to those of the mainland.  
6
 Laws 159/99 and 1969/99 modified by law 5-A/2002 define the attributions and competences of 
Portuguese local governments. 
7
 There were four local finance laws: Law n. 1/79, Law n. 1/87, Law n. 42/98, and Law n. 2/07.  
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However, even for formula transfers, until 1998 the central government could influence 
the total amount distributed, which means that it could use them for electoral purposes.  
 
4. Data and econometric model 
The dataset used in this study covers the 278 municipalities of continental 
Portugal, with annual data from 1979 to 2005. Legislative election dates and results 
were obtained from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process 
(STAPE) of the Portuguese Internal Affairs Ministry. Data on transfers from the central 
government to the municipalities were obtained from the local authority’s (Direcção 
Geral das Autarquias Locais - DGAL) annual publication Finanças Municipais. This 
report exists from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2006. For the two missing years, data 
was obtained directly from the municipalities’ official accounts and are incomplete: we 
have 182 observations for 1984 and 189 for 1985. The national consumer price index, 
real GDP, and industrial production index were obtained from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics, and the unemployment rate from the OECD’s Main Economic 
Indicators. Finally, demographic data was obtained in the 1970, 1981, 1991 and 2001 
Census and in the Anuário Estatístico Regional of the National Statistics Office (INE). 
 The main purpose of our empirical analysis is to test the following hypotheses: 
(1) election-year increases in grants transferred to a municipality lead to higher vote 
shares for the government; and, (2) increases in grants in election years are influenced 
by the expected change in vote shares from one election to the other. Hypothesis (1) 
will be tested by estimating a voting function in which the dependent variable, ∆Votesit, 
is the change, from one election to the next, in vote shares received in the municipality 
by the national government party (∆Votesit = Votesit - Votesi,t-1). A pork barrel equation 
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will be estimated in order to test Hypothesis (2), in which the dependent variable, 
∆Grantsit, is the percentage change in real total grants per capita in the election year. 
The above-mentioned hypotheses imply that the dependent variable of one 
equation appears as an explanatory variable in the other equation. Given this 
endogeneity, the most appropriate empirical strategy is to estimate a system of two 
simultaneous equations.  
Our baseline model consists of a voting function (1), and an equation for the 
growth of intergovernmental grants (2).  
 
∆Votesit = α + β1∆Grantsit + β2Grant_Meanit + β3Votesit-1 + β4Same_Partyit +  
 β5Inflationt-1 + β6∆Unemp_Ratet-1 + νi + δt + εit (1) 
∆Grantsit = γ + φ1∆Votesit + φ2Granti,t-1 + φ3Same_Partyit + φ4Votesit-1 + 
 φ5Majorityit + φ6Popi,t-1 + φ7Pop2i,t-1 + φ8Pop65i,t-1 + φ9SD(Votes)it + 
  λi + φt + µit (2) 
 
 i = 1, ..., 278 is the index for municipalities, t indicates time, α and γ are constants, β1-
β6 and φ1-φ9 are parameters to be estimated, νi and λi are the individual effects of 
municipality i, δt and φt are dummy variables for the election of year t, and εit and µit are 
the errors terms. 
In the voting function (1), election year increases in real per capita grants 
transferred by the central government to municipalities (∆Grantsit) are expected to 
improve re-election prospects. Transfers represent the main source of funding for 
municipalities and condition expenditure decisions that generate welfare gains for the 
citizens. Higher average total grants per capita received by the local government over 
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the entire term of the Government (Grant_Meanit) are also expected to increase votes. 
Thus, we expect positive signs for β1 and β2. 
Since governments with a larger support base tend to have more swing voters, a 
negative sign is expected for the coefficient (β3) associated with the share in votes in 
the previous election (Votesit-1). In order to evaluate if voters prefer not to concentrate 
all the power in one party, we included a dummy variable (Same_Partyit) which takes 
the value of one when the mayor’s party is in the national government, and equals zero 
otherwise. Following Alesina and Rosenthal (1996), a negative sign is expected for β4. 
According to Veiga and Veiga (2004), Portuguese voters hold governments 
responsible for the evolution of the economy. There is also evidence that they are 
myopic, namely that events that occurred in the recent past are more important 
determinants of voting behavior than those that occurred longer ago. Thus, the change 
in the vote share of the government party from one election to the next is very likely to 
be affected by changes in macroeconomic variables, such as consumer prices and 
unemployment rates in the year before elections. Concretely, we expect that positive 
percentage changes in consumer prices (Inflationt-1) and in unemployment rates 
(∆Unemp_Ratet-1) will lead to decreases in vote shares of the government party 
(negative signs are expected for β5 and β6). Since voters will not know the values of 
those variables for the election year when they vote, their first lags (the values in the 
pre-election year) are used in the estimations. 
Equation (2) explains the growth rate of intergovernmental grants per capita in 
election years. If grants are used as pork barrel, during election years the central 
government will target municipalities where it faces higher risks of losing support. 
Therefore, a negative sign is expected for the coefficient (φ1) associated with ∆Votesit, 
which proxies the expected change in votes, estimated in equation (1). Since large 
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increases in grants are harder where they are already large, a negative sign is expected 
for the coefficient (φ2) associated with real total grants per capita in the year prior to the 
election (Granti,t-1). 
To test Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) hypothesis that electoral increases in grants 
are higher to municipalities where the government has stronger political support, a 
dummy for party similarity between the government and the mayor (Same_Partyit), and 
a variable measuring the share in votes in the previous election (Votesit-1) were included. 
Positive signs of both coefficients, φ3 and φ4, are expected. 
When a majority of the deputies in parliament belongs to the government party, 
budgets that allow for electoral manipulation of intergovernmental grants are more 
likely to be approved. This hypothesis is tested by including in the model the dummy 
variable Majorityit, which takes the value of one for governments having a majority at 
the National Assembly (Parliament), and equals zero otherwise. The estimated 
coefficient (φ5) is expected to be positive. 
Popi,t-1 represents a municipality’s population, in thousands. The bigger the 
population of a municipality is, the costlier it is for the government to increase the 
grants per capita transferred to it. Thus, a negative coefficient is expected for φ6. 
Population squared (Pop2i,t-1) was also included to allow for non linear effects. Taking 
into account that voter awareness may reduce the electoral pay-off of pork barrel 
measures, we introduced the percentage of the population over 65 years old (Pop65i,t-1), 
as a proxy for low education levels (φ8 is expected to be positive).8 
Finally, the standard deviation of the difference in the percentage of votes 
obtained by the two main parties (PSD and PS) alternating in the central government, 
                                                 
8
 Demographic variables are lagged one year in order to avoid endogeneity problems that could result 
from the fact that increased transfers to a municipality could induce people to move to it. 
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SD(VOTESit), is used to test Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1993) hypothesis that politicians 
target swing voters.9 A positive estimated coefficient (φ9) is expected. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables referred to above are presented in Table 2. 
The mean of the growth in total grants per capita from the pre-electoral year to the 
electoral period is 9.85 euros of 2000, while for the whole sample is 5.11, which 
supports the hypothesis that central governments behave opportunistically. A positive 
value is also observed for the growth in current and capital grants, with the latter almost 
doubling the former. This suggests a larger manipulation of capital grants than of 
current grants, which is accordance with evidence provided by Veiga and Veiga (2007b) 
of larger political business cycles in municipal capital expenditures than in current 
expenditures. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated as a system of simultaneous equations, using 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) which is a robust estimator in that it does not 
require information of the exact distribution of the disturbances.10 GMM estimation is 
based upon the assumption that the disturbances in the equations are uncorrelated with a 
set of instrumental variables. The set of instrumental variables of each equation used in 
our estimations includes all exogenous right-hand side variables of both equations 
(including municipal and time dummies). The GMM estimator selects parameter 
estimates so that the correlations between the instruments and disturbances are as close 
to zero as possible, as defined by a criterion function. By choosing the weighting matrix 
                                                 
9
 This variable is defined as the standard deviation of the vote difference (PSD-PS) in all previous 
elections since 1976. It varies over time as more observations (elections) become available. 
10
 This is an advantage relative to Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), an alternative method 
for the estimation of systems of simultaneous equations, which assumes that the contemporaneous errors 
have a joint normal distribution. Another caveat of FIML is that it propagates to the system any 
specification error in the structure of the model. 
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in the criterion function appropriately, GMM can be made robust to heteroskedasticity 
and/or autocorrelation of unknown form.11 
 
5. Empirical results 
 The systems of simultaneous equations were estimated using Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) on a panel of 278 municipalities, over ten national 
legislative elections (1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, and 2005). 
Estimations were performed controlling for fixed effects of municipalities and election-
specific effects.12 The results of the estimation of Equation (1) are shown in Table 3-A, 
and those of Equation (2) in Table 3-B.13 
The results shown in Table 3-A provide strong evidence that increases in 
intergovernmental grants in electoral years improve political outcomes. According to 
the results of column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the growth of real total 
grants per capita increases the vote share of the government party by approximately 1 
(=0.03*33.52) percentage point, which is by no means a negligible effect. Furthermore, 
if we take into account the fact that there are many cases in which total grants more than 
double in the election year, the opportunistic manipulation of intergovernmental 
transfers may be capable of affecting the outcome of close elections. 
The average level of grants received by a municipality over the governments’ 
term does not seem to influence electoral outcomes, suggesting that voters are myopic: 
                                                 
11
 In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the GMM estimator brings efficiency gains relative to Three-
Stage Least Squares (3SLS), another alternative method of estimation of systems of simultaneous 
equations. 
12
 One election year dummy must be dropped for each national macroeconomic variable included. 
13
 Although it would be preferable to show all results in just one table, it would imply using a very small 
font size, which would make results hard to read. Thus, we opted to split Table 3 in two tables, one for 
each equation.  
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they only reward increases in spending close to elections, not the level of spending over 
an entire term. As expected, governments lose more votes in municipalities were they 
had higher vote shares in previous elections, but party similarity between the mayor and 
the government does not seem to affect votes. National economic performance strongly 
conditions electoral outcomes, supporting the hypothesis that voters hold incumbents 
responsible for the evolution of the economy. This result is consistent with the evidence 
in favour of the responsibility hypothesis found in most of the vote/popularity functions 
literature. 
 The results for the determinants of pork barrel measures, shown in Table 3-B, 
reveal that municipalities where the government expects votes to increase less, or to 
decrease more, (lower ∆Votesit) benefit from higher increases in grants in election years. 
That is, grants are used strategically to win elections. A one standard deviation 
reduction in the vote share leads to an increase in total grants per capita of 
approximately 13 (=-1.13*11.57) percentage points. 
We also find evidence that governments target municipalities with higher 
percentages of the population over 65 years old (with lower education and voter 
awareness). There is a U-shaped statistical relationship between changes in grants and 
municipal population, with the turning point at about 420,000 inhabitants. The 
negatively sloped part of this relationship is due to financial constraints: it is costlier to 
increase grants per capita in more populous municipalities. The positively sloped part 
reveals that central governments assign more political importance to winning votes in 
Lisbon, the Portuguese capital, which is the only municipality with more than 420,000 
inhabitants. Finally, as expected, changes in grants depend negatively on the amount 
transferred in the pre-electoral year. 
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Percentage changes in grants do not seem to depend on the support received in 
the previous election, on party similarity between the mayor and the government, on the 
incidence of swing voters, or on whether the government is majoritarian or not. 
The results of a more parsimonious model are shown in column 2 of Table 3 (A 
and B). This model excludes the explanatory variables that were not statistically 
significant in the estimation of column 1,14 and the empirical results are virtually the 
same. Then, as a robustness check, alternative proxies for the evolution of the national 
economy were used in Equation 1, replacing the Change in the Unemployment Rate. 
Real GDP Growth is used in the estimation of column 3, while Growth of the Industrial 
Production Index is used in that of column 4. Both are highly statistically significant, 
with the expected positive sign. That is, as anticipated, higher growth rates of GDP or of 
the industrial production index, both indicating better economic performance, lead to 
higher vote shares for the government. The results concerning the other explanatory 
variables are very similar to those shown in column 2. 
To check the robustness of the results to a change in the system estimation 
method, we also performed the estimations using Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML), which is the asymptotically efficient estimator for linear and 
nonlinear simultaneous models, under the assumption that the disturbances are 
multivariate normal. When this assumption fails, FIML may still be asymptotically 
efficient. The results obtained when using this alternative system estimation method are 
reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 (A and B). They are very similar to those of 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 (obtained using GMM). Thus, regardless of the system 
                                                 
14
 Wald tests allow for the exclusion of those variables. 
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estimation method chosen, there is clear empirical support for the theoretical 
predictions.15 
All estimations referred to above were performed using real total grants per 
capita. It is interesting to check if similar results are obtained when considering only 
capital grants or current grants. Since Veiga and Veiga (2007b) found empirical 
evidence of political business cycles in municipal capital expenditures, namely in 
investment expenditures highly visible to the electorate, but not in current expenditures, 
we anticipate that the strategic allocation of grants by the national government is 
stronger for capital grants than for current grants.16 The results obtained when 
considering capital grants only are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 (A and B). 
They are very similar to those of columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 (A and B). Thus, we reach 
the same conclusions when using capital grants instead of total grants. Although the 
results for current grants are also similar in the political outcome equation (columns 5 
and 6 of Table 4-A), the Change in vote shares is not statistically significant in the pork 
barrel equation (columns 5 and 6 of Table 4-B). This implies that intergovernmental 
transfers of current grants are not affected by the expected electoral results for the 
government.  
These results are consistent with those of Veiga and Veiga (2007a), who show 
that the opportunistic election-year behaviour of mayors pays off in terms of increased 
vote shares when spending consists of investment items such as overpasses, streets, 
rural roads, and other constructions. Since they do not find evidence that increases in 
municipal current expenditures lead to larger votes shares, it is no surprise that 
                                                 
15
 We also estimated the models of columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 using FIML. Again, the results, not 
shown here in order to economize space, are very similar to those obtained with GMM. These are 
available from the authors upon request. 
16
 Veiga and Veiga (2007b) also show that increases in capital transfers from the central government lead 
to increases in investment expenditures of municipalities. 
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governments do not strategically manipulate the transfers of current grants, but do so for 
capital grants. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Several studies have demonstrated that intergovernmental grants tend to increase 
during balloting years. However, the determinants of the distribution of these pork 
barrel grants, as well as their political return, have received very little attention. 
Elections provide a mechanism for citizens to express their preferences and to hold 
politicians accountable for economic conditions. However, in centralized countries like 
Portugal, democracy also creates political incentives for central governments to 
distribute more “pork” during electoral periods, particularly to jurisdiction where they 
are in greater danger of losing votes. 
 Using a sample of all Portuguese mainland municipalities, and covering ten 
elections (1979-2005), we find strong evidence that electoral year increases in 
intergovernmental grants pay off in terms of electoral support, and that the central 
government targets municipalities where it expects greater losses of votes. Consistent 
with the responsibility hypothesis, the results also reveal that legislative political 
outcomes in municipalities are influenced by the macroeconomic situation of the 
country. Therefore, a policy recommendation that can be extracted from our research is 
that it would be desirable to attribute more financial independence to local governments 
That is, to adopt decentralization measures that reduce the degree of fiscal discretion of 
central governments to use transfers as a political tool to win elections. 
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Table 1: Legislative elections and parties in government 
 
Dates of elections Winning party % Votes Prime-Minister Form of government 
     April 25, 1976 
- 
- 
December 2, 1979 
October 5, 1980 
April 25, 1983 
October 6, 1985 
July 19, 1987 
October 6, 1991 
October 1, 1995 
October 10, 1999 
March 17, 2002 
February 20, 2005 
September 27, 2009 
PS 
- 
- 
AD 
AD 
PS 
PPD/PSD 
PPD/PSD 
PPD/PSD 
PS 
PS 
PPD/PSD 
PS 
PS 
34.9% 
- 
- 
42.2% 
44.4% 
36.3% 
29.7% 
50.1% 
50.4% 
43.8% 
44.0% 
40.1% 
45.0% 
36.6% 
Mário Soares 
Mota Pinto 
M. L. Pintassilgo 
Sá Carneiro 
Pinto Balsemão 
Mário Soares 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
António Guterres 
António Guterres 
Durão Barroso(a) 
José Sócrates 
José Sócrates 
One party, minority 
Presidential appointment (1978-79) 
Presidential appointment (1979-80) 
Coalition (AD=PSD+CDS+PPM) 
Coalition (AD=PSD+CDS+PPM)  
Coalition (PS+PSD) 
One party, minority 
One party, majority 
One party, majority 
One party, minority 
One party, minority 
Coalition (PSD+CDS/PP) 
One party, majority 
One party, minority 
 
Source: Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process of the Internal Affairs Ministry. 
Notes: PPD/PSD - People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party; PS - Socialist Party; CDS/PP - Democratic 
and Social Center / People’s Party; PPM - Monarchic People’s Party. 
 (a)  In July 2004, Durão Barroso resigned (in order to become the President of the European Commission) and a 
new government, also a coalition of PSD and CDS/PP, was formed under the leadership of Santana Lopes. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations 
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Change in vote shares 2099 -3.68 11.57 -30.78 36.34 
Share in Votes in the Previous Election 2099 43.73 14.53 5.47 85.45 
Growth in Total Grants relative to the previous year 2099 9.85 33.52 -76.14 538.99 
Total Grants  2099 346.13 323.04 37.10 3079.16 
Total Grants (Term Mean) 2099 318.53 251.65 48.95 1785.88 
Mayor Belongs to a Government Party 2099 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Inflation Rate (Annual) 2099 9.19 7.92 2.29 25.11 
Change in the Unemployment Rate (Annual) 2099 2.37 14.42 -17.73 24.08 
GDP Growth (Annual) 2099 2.92 2.66 -0.19 8.45 
Growth of the Industrial Production Index (Annual) 2099 2.49 3.16 -1.30 8.99 
Majority 2099 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Population (thousands) 2099 34.95 59.56 1.77 770.90 
% Population Over 65 Years Old 2099 18.37 6.07 5.59 42.02 
Standard Deviation of Votes 2099 16.31 3.68 2.27 35.67 
Growth in Capital Grants relative to the previous year 2098 14.98 67.55 -95.82 1158.20 
Capital Grants  2098 188.56 222.20 5.54 2791.42 
Capital Grants (Term Mean) 2098 171.49 145.78 19.74 1171.89 
Growth in Current Grants relative to the previous year 2097 7.87 11.11 -86.66 148.59 
Current Grants  2097 157.80 124.53 0.03 979.14 
Current Grants (Term Mean) 2099 147.11 114.90 0.03 930.63 
Sources: DGAL, IMF, INE, OECD, MTSS, Marktest, STAPE and municipal official accounts. 
Note: Grants are measured in euros per capita at 2000 prices. 
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Table 3-A: Pork Barrel and Votes (Political Outcome Equation) 
     
 1 2 3 4 
     
     Equation (1): Political outcome 
(Dependent Variable: Change in vote shares) 
   
 
Growth in Total Grants relative to the previous year 
 
.03 
(10.7)** 
.03 
(13.1)** 
.02 
(8.85)** 
.03 
(13.1)** 
Total Grants (Term Mean) -.00001 
(-.19) 
   
Share in Votes in the Previous Election -.07 
(-8.24)** 
-.06 
(-10.8)** 
-.07 
(-11.4)** 
-.06 
(-10.8)** 
Mayor Belongs to a Government Party .26 
(1.50) 
   
Inflation (-1) -1.38 
(-62.4)** 
-1.38 
(-63.2)** 
-0.06 
(-6.81)** 
-2.74 
(-69.8)** 
Change in the Unemployment Rate (-1) -9.31 
(-67.5)** 
-9.33 
(-70.1)** 
  
GDP Growth (-1) 
 
  11.49 
(78.4)** 
 
Growth of the Industrial Production Index (-1)    11.02 
(70.1)** 
     
     # Observations 2099 2099 2099 2099 
Adjusted R2 .89 .89 .89 .89 
     
Notes: Systems of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM. Models estimated with municipal and election-year 
dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: **1%; and 
*, 5%. 
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Table 3-B: Pork Barrel and Votes (Pork Barrel Equation) 
     
 1 2 3 4 
     
     Equation (2): Pork barrel 
(Dependent Variable: Growth in Total Grants relative to the Previous Year) 
Change in vote shares  -1.13 
(-4.93)** 
-1.18 
(-6.39)** 
-1.20 
(-6.27)** 
-1.18 
(-6.39)** 
Total Grants (-1) -.02 
(-3.80)** 
-.02 
(-4.21)** 
-.02 
(-4.00)** 
-.02 
(-4.21)** 
Share in Votes in the Previous Election -6.65 
(-1.07) 
   
Majority -2.95 
(-1.33) 
   
Mayor Belongs to a Government Party 2.61 
(1.65) 
   
Population (-1) -.42 
(-4.07)** 
-.39 
(-4.47)** 
-.39 
(-4.59)** 
-.32 
(-3.30)** 
Population Squared (-1) .0005 
(3.76)** 
.0005 
(4.10)** 
.0005 
(4.21)** 
.0005 
(4.10)** 
% Population Over 65 Years Old (-1) .72 
(3.55)** 
.62 
(3.25)** 
.60 
(3.10)** 
.62 
(3.25)** 
Standard Deviation of Votes .21 
(1.27) 
   
     
     # Observations 2099 2099 2099 2099 
Adjusted R2 .32 .22 .28 .22 
     
Notes: Systems of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM. Models estimated with municipal and election-
year dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
**1%; and *, 5%. 
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Table 4-A: Robustness Tests (Political Outcome Equation) 
       
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 FIML FIML GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 Total 
Grants 
Total 
Grants 
Capital 
Grants 
Capital 
Grants 
Current 
Grants 
Current 
Grants 
       
       Equation (1): Political outcome 
(Dependent Variable: Change in vote shares) 
  
  
  
Growth in Grants relative to the previous year 
 
.04 
(3.15)** 
.03 
(2.79)** 
.01 
(5.03)** 
.01 
(6.75)** 
.05 
(2.16)* 
.02 
(2.23)* 
Grants (Term Mean) -.0001 
(-1.45) 
-.0004 
(-.75) 
.00003 
(.11) 
 .0002 
(.37) 
 
Share in Votes in the Previous Election -.08 
(-8.88)** 
-.07 
(-9.56)** 
-6.97 
(-10.3)** 
-6.38 
(-10.8)** 
-7.15 
(-10.5)** 
-5.93 
(-10.2)** 
Mayor Belongs to a Government Party .37 
(1.80) 
 .31 
(1.77) 
 .32 
(1.78) 
 
Inflation (-1) -1.38 
(-33.9)** 
-1.39 
(-33.5)** 
-1.39 
(-63.2)** 
-1.39 
(-64.3)** 
-1.41 
(-63.5)** 
-1.42 
(-67.1)** 
Change in the Unemployment Rate (-1) -9.53 
(-69.8)** 
-9.61 
(-68.8)** 
-9.33 
(-68.3)** 
-9.34 
(-71.3)** 
-9.45 
(-68.9)** 
-9.49 
(-72.4** 
       
       # Observations 2099 2099 2098 2098 2097 2097 
Adjusted R2 .89 .89 .90 .90 .90 .90 
       
Notes: Systems of simultaneous equations estimated with municipal and election-year dummies. Robust t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: **1%; and *, 5%. 
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Table 4-B: Robustness Tests (Pork Barrel Equation) 
       
 1 1 3 4 5 6 
 FIML FIML GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 Total 
Grants 
Total 
Grants 
Capital 
Grants 
Capital 
Grants 
Current 
Grants 
Current 
Grants 
       
       Equation (2): Pork barrel 
(Dependent Variable: Growth in Grants relative to the Previous Year) 
Change in vote shares  -1.23 
(-2.44)* 
-1.09 
(-2.41)* 
-2.09 
(-4.86)** 
-1.97 
(-5.91)** 
.10 
(.85) 
.03 
(.58) 
Grants (-1) -.02 
(-2.91)** 
-.02 
(-3.05)** 
-.09 
(-5.53)** 
-.09 
(-5.75)** 
-.01 
(-2.21)* 
-.003 
(-.70) 
Share in Votes in the Previous Election -8.45 
(-.81) 
 -8.53 
(-.70) 
 13.08 
(1.61) 
 
Majority -1.71 
(-.29) 
 -.41 
(-.09) 
 -6.26 
(-2.57)* 
 
Mayor Belongs to a Government Party -.93 
(-.47) 
 5.38 
(1.76) 
 -2.64 
(-.68) 
 
Population (-1) -.28 
(-4.95)** 
-.28 
(-5.05)** 
-.78 
(-5.00)** 
-.68 
(-5.13)** 
-.07 
(-1.47) 
.03 
(1.01) 
Population Squared (-1) .0004 
(3.83)** 
.0004 
(3.89)** 
.001 
(4.75)** 
.001 
(4.88)** 
.00001 
(1.06) 
-.00001 
(-1.38) 
% Population Over 65 Years Old (-1) .50 
(2.26)* 
.53 
(2.41)** 
1.74 
(4.73)** 
1.63 
(4.63)** 
.26 
(3.51)** 
.21 
(2.93)** 
Standard Deviation of Votes .19 
(.70) 
 .49 
(1.57) 
 -.01 
(-.15) 
 
       
       # Observations 2099 2099 2098 2098 2097 2097 
Adjusted R2 .10 .11 .10 .10 .07 .02 
       
Notes: Systems of simultaneous equations estimated with municipal and election-year dummies. Robust t-statistics are in 
parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: **1%; and *, 5%. 
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